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TRAHAN V. KINGREY: AN ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S
RELOCATION STATUTE
John H. Leech, Jr.*
I. BACKGROUND
Trahan v. Kingrey 1 involves the question of relocation of the
minor child, Devon, of Douglas Anthony Trahan and Elizabeth
Donald Kingrey Romero. Devon was born on January 3, 2005 in
Lafayette, Louisiana. Devon’s mother, Elizabeth Kingrey, was
unmarried at the time of Devon’s birth and paternity was in
question until DNA testing confirmed that Douglas Trahan was
Devon’s biological father. 2 After confirmation by DNA testing,
Trahan fully accepted the obligations and responsibilities of
parenthood. 3 Two months after Devon’s birth, Trahan and Kingrey
entered into a consent judgment which stated that they were to
share equal joint custody of Devon on a one-week rotating basis. 4
Kingrey was designated as the domiciliary parent. 5
Kingrey subsequently married Timothy Romero on July 21,
2005, who was her husband during the proceedings surrounding
this case. 6 Romero’s employer, The Wood Group, was in the
process of shutting down its facilities in Louisiana. 7 Romero was
offered a promotion to stay with The Wood Group, but that
promotion required his relocation to West Virginia. 8 Rather than
filing a “Notice of Relocation,” as required by Louisiana Revised
* J.D. Candidate, LSU Law Center (2014). The author would like to
provide a special thanks to Professor Elizabeth R. Carter for her assistance and
guidance in the production of this case note. A special thanks also to Jennifer
Lane and Alexandru-Daniel On of the JCLS.
1. Trahan v. Kingrey, 2011-1900 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/12), 98 So. 3d 347.
2. Id. at 349.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Statutes 9:355, et seq., Kingrey filed a “Rule for Custody” on July
15, 2009, stating that the move to West Virginia was required for
her husband (Romero) to keep his employment. 9 In her “Rule for
Custody,” Kingrey alleged that the move to West Virginia would
require a change to the shared custody arrangement. 10 Trahan filed
a “Rule for Change of Custody” in opposition to Kingrey’s request
for relocation of Devon, alleging that it was in the child’s best
interest that he be named domiciliary custodial parent rather than
Kingrey. 11 Trahan filed a subsequent pleading which alleged that
Kingrey failed to follow the statutory requirements of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq. because she failed to give him notice
of the proposed relocation and failed to provide the address,
telephone number, date of move, proposed revised schedule of
visitation, and a statement informing him that an objection to the
proposed relocation should be filed within thirty days of the receipt
of the notice. 12 While awaiting judgment, Trahan and Kingrey
entered into an interim consent judgment on September 4, 2009,
wherein they agreed that they would share custody of Devon on a
twenty-eight day rotating basis. 13
The trial court entered judgment granting the parties joint
custody of Devon with Kingrey designated as the domiciliary
parent, subject to visitation in favor of Trahan, pursuant to a Joint
Custody Plan confected by the trial court. 14 Devon was to reside
with Kingrey in West Virginia. 15 In written reasons for judgment,
the court stated that, because all prior judgments issued in
conjunction with this matter were by consent of the parties, and
that there had never been a “considered decree” rendered in the
case, “each party need only prove a change in circumstances
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
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materially affecting the welfare of Devon and that any proposed
changes to the previous child custody decree are in the best interest
of Devon.” 16 The court also stated that it had considered the factors
listed in Civil Code article 134 which are to be used to determine
the best interest of a child for custody purposes and that the court
came to its determination that Kingrey be the domiciliary custodial
parent of Devon, subject to visitation with Trahan, based on those
factors. 17
Trahan filed a motion for new trial with the trial court, which
was denied. 18 Appeal to the First Circuit subsequently followed. 19
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
A. Standard of Review
The Court determined that this case was to be reviewed de
novo. The Court proceeded with its determination that the trial
court ruling should be reviewed de novo by quoting from Evans v.
Lungrin: 20 “where one of more trial court legal errors interdict the
fact-finding process, the appellate court should then make its own
independent de novo review of the record.” 21 The legal error the
appellate court identified was the failure of the trial court to
analyze this case based on the relocation statutes (Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq.). 22 Instead, the trial court used the
“best interest” factors for awarding custody (Louisiana Civil Code
article 134). 23 The trial court may have reasoned that Civil Code
article 134 was the proper law to analyze this case due to the fact
that Kingrey’s rule only requested a modification of custody rather
16. Id. at 350.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 708 So. 2d 731, 735, citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1006
(La. 1993).
21. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 351.
22. Id. at 350.
23. Id.
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than a true relocation. The practical effect, however, of Kingrey’s
rule for modification of custody was to create a relocation. The
appellate court determined that the relocation factors should have
been analyzed by the trial court, despite the improper filing by
Kingrey. 24 Thus, legal error was committed because the trial court
applied the incorrect principles of law, and such errors were
prejudicial, which caused deprivation of substantial rights to
Trahan. 25
B. Burden of Proof
The appellate court made note that the burden of proof in this
case was different than what the trial court assumed. 26 In
relocation cases:
The relocating parent has the burden of proof that the
proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best
interest of the child. In determining the child’s best interest,
the court shall consider the benefits which the child will
derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in
the relocating parent’s general quality of life. 27
Therefore, the appellate court determined that Kingrey had to
not only show that the relocation was done in good faith, but that
such relocation was also in Devon’s best interest. 28
C. Good Faith
The party seeking relocation—in this case Kingrey—bears the
burden of showing that the relocation is made in good faith. 29 The
appellate court made the initial determination that Kingrey was in
good faith when she first relocated with her husband, Timothy

24. Id. at 350-51.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 352.
27. Id. at 352, citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.13 (2010) (now La. Rev.
Stat. 9:355.10, with language revised by Acts 2012, No. 627, §1).
28. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 352.
29. Id.
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Romero. 30 However, the facts changed after the initial move.
Originally, Kingrey relocated to West Virginia because her
husband was forced to take a job there in order to retain his
employment with The Wood Group. 31 At the time of trial,
however, Romero no longer worked for The Wood Group. 32 He
had resigned his position in March of 2010, and accepted work
with a competitor, Seaboard International, located in West
Virginia. 33 There was no evidence that Romero attempted to find
comparable employment in Louisiana. 34 Therefore, the Court was
left questioning whether Kingrey remained in good faith. 35
D. Best Interest
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 36 lists twelve factors
which the court shall consider when evaluating whether a proposed
relocation is in the child’s best interests. 37 The twelve factors are
as follows: (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and
duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to
relocate and with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other
significant persons in the child’s life; (2) The age, developmental
stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will
have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional
development, taking into consideration any special needs of the
child; (3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between
the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances
30. Id.
31. Id. at 349.
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 352-53.
35. Id.
36. LA. REV. STAT. 9:355.14 is where the relocation factors are located as of
August 1, 2012. This case references the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT.
9:355.12, which is where the relocation factors were located at the time of this
case. This case note will refer to the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT.
9:355.14.
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.14 (2012).
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of the parties; (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration
the child’s age and maturity level; (5) Whether there is an
established pattern of conduct of the parent seeking the relocation,
either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the
non-relocating party; (6) Whether the relocation of the child will
enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial parent
seeking the relocation and the child, including but not limited to
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity; (7) The
reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation; (8)
The current employment and economic circumstances of each
parent and whether or not the proposed relocation is necessary to
improve the circumstances of the parent seeking relocation of the
child; (9) The extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled his
or her financial obligations to the parent seeking relocation,
including child support, spousal support, and community property
obligations; (10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting
parent; (11) Any history of substance abuse or violence by either
parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct
and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation; and (12)
Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child. 38
The court is required to consider these factors, as opposed to
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 which lists factors that a court
may consider when determining a child’s best interests in custody
matters. 39
The Court weighed factors one, three, five, six, seven, eight,
and ten in favor of Trahan. 40
The first factor in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14
concerns the nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of
the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and
with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other significant

38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
39. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 353.
40. Trahan, 98 So. 3d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2012).
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persons in the child’s life. 41 The Court found that the sheer
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would inhibit the
relationships between Devon and his numerous family members,
especially that of his grandparents. 42 The Court considered also
that while Trahan had no relatives in the West Virginia area,
Kingrey did have relatives in Louisiana in the form of her new
adoptive parents in Lafayette. 43 The presence of family in
Louisiana provided Kingrey with more opportunities to visit
Devon in Louisiana than it would Trahan in West Virginia. 44
The third factor concerns the feasibility of preserving a good
relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child
through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics
and financial circumstances of the parties. 45 According to the
visitation schedule the trial court devised, Trahan was responsible
both for picking up Devon and returning him back to West
Virginia, and was to incur all of the associated costs. 46 The sheer
distance in miles and travel time from West Virginia to Louisiana
burdened Trahan to the point that the Court believed that even if
such travel was financially feasible, it would greatly decrease both
the frequency and the amount of time that Devon would be able to
see his father, his paternal grandparents, and other family. 47
The fifth factor concerns whether there is an established pattern
of conduct of the parent seeking relocation, either to promote or
thwart the relationship of the child and the non-relocating party. 48
The Court noted that Kingrey, in the past, had refused to disclose
Devon’s daycare/school names and locations to Trahan. 49 Kingrey
also would not put Trahan as an emergency contact for Devon’s
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
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schools and instead placed her husband, Romero, as an emergency
contact. 50 The Court also took note of Kingrey’s hostility toward
Trahan and his parents during her testimony, and it stated that there
were concerns that she would attempt to thwart Trahan’s
relationship with Devon. 51
The sixth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14
considers whether the relocation of the child will enhance the
general quality of life for both the custodial parent seeking the
relocation and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
emotional benefit or educational opportunity. 52 Because Kingrey is
the parent who relocated, she carried the burden of proof to show
that there was a benefit to the child, Devon, in this move. 53 Both
housing locations were suitable for Devon. 54 The schools available
to Devon in West Virginia and in Houma were seen as equal in the
Court’s eyes. 55 There was an assumption that the move to West
Virginia resulted in an increase in salary for Romero, but the Court
noted that there was nothing in the record indicating what he was
making in Louisiana and, therefore, there could not be a
calculation of any salary increase. 56 Kingrey did not claim that she
was unable to obtain any employment while in Louisiana. 57 Given
this information, the Court determined that Kingrey did not meet
her burden of proving that the move to West Virginia enhanced
Devon’s general quality of life and considered this factor to weight
against allowing relocation. 58
Factor seven of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 considers
the reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation.59
The Court stated that Kingrey’s request to relocate originally was
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.at 358.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
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in good faith, because it was due to the fact that her husband,
Romero, either had to make the move to West Virginia or lose his
job with his company, which was closing its business in
Louisiana. 60 However, that good faith was in question due to the
fact that Romero subsequently accepted another job in West
Virginia with another company and there was nothing to indicate
that he attempted to find employment in Louisiana. 61
Factor eight considers the current employment and economic
circumstances of each parent and whether or not the proposed
relocation is necessary to improve the circumstances of the parent
seeking relocation of the child. 62 Originally, the move to West
Virginia was due to the fact that the company that Romero worked
for 63 was closing its offices in Louisiana and told him that, in order
to keep his position with the company, he would need to transfer to
West Virginia. 64 Kingrey, herself, did not need to make the move
for her own employment. 65 Therefore, the Court determined that
Kingrey had failed in meeting her burden of proving that the
relocation was necessary to improve her circumstances. 66
The tenth factor requires the court to consider the feasibility of
a relocation by the objecting parent. 67 The Court speculated that
Trahan, who is a registered nurse, could likely obtain employment
in West Virginia. 68 However, the Court noted that Trahan also did
not wish to leave his family69 behind to move to West Virginia. 70

60. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 359.
61. Id.
62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
63. The Wood Group.
64. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 349.
65. Id. at 359. It is important to remember that Romero had also ceased
working for The Wood Group and there was no evidence provided that he had
attempted to find employment in Louisiana before accepting another position in
West Virginia. Id.
66. Id.
67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
68. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
69. Consisting of approximately ninety relatives in or around Houma.
70. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
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The Court found that factors two, four, nine, eleven, and twelve
weighed in favor of neither party. 71
The second factor considers the age, developmental stage,
needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on
the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development,
taking into consideration any special needs of the child. 72 The
Court determined that, as to Devon’s health and educational
concerns, there was no evidence that either West Virginia or
Louisiana was more beneficial than the other. 73
The fourth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 is the
child’s preference, taking into consideration the child’s age and
maturity level. 74 Because of Devon’s young age and the fact that
both parents seem to have a good relationship with Devon, the
Court determined that this factor did not weigh in favor or either
Trahan or Kingrey. 75
Factor nine evaluates the extent to which the objecting parent
has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent seeking
relocation, including child support, spousal support, and
community property obligations. 76 The Court noted that Trahan
had always timely paid his child support obligations and there was
no judgment or holding that Trahan had ever been in contempt for
failing to make child support payments. 77
Factor eleven considers any history of substance abuse or
violence by either parent, including a consideration of the severity
of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at
rehabilitation. 78 The parties in this case, in the past, had abused
drugs, and both alleged past instances of violence by the other. 79
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 347.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 356.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
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The Court also noted that since Devon’s birth, there were no
allegations of either drug abuse or violence by either party. 80 The
past custody agreement in which the parties split time with Devon
evenly indicated that Kingrey did not consider Trahan to be a
threat to Devon. 81 Therefore, the Court found that that factor did
not weigh in favor or either party. 82
The final factor, factor twelve, is a catch-all provision requiring
the court to evaluate any other factors affecting the best interest of
the child. 83 The Court here found no other factors affecting the best
interest of the child that had not already been covered. 84
The Court found none of the twelve factors in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 to weigh in favor of Kingrey. 85
E. Other Suggestive Factors
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 provides twelve factors that
are used in determining the custody of a child and were suggestive
in this relocation case. 86 The Court considered most of what is
provided for in Louisiana Civil Code article 134 by looking at the
mandatory factors in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, but the
Court evaluated some of the factors in article 134 that were not
explicitly covered. 87
Factor 1 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody
proceeding to consider “the love, affection, and other emotional
ties between each party and the child.” 88 Factor 2 of Civil Code
article 134 requires a court in a custody proceeding to consider
“the capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
Id at 347.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
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rearing of the child.” 89 Factor 3 requires a court to consider “the
capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.” 90 The
Court compared the availability of each party for the care of Devon
and found that both parties were available to care for Devon, even
though both parties required the aid of others in their households
(Kingrey required help from Romero, and Trahan required the help
of his parents, with whom he lived). 91
Factor 4 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody
proceeding to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a
stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining
continuity of that environment. Factor 5 requires a court to
consider “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes.” 92 The Court noted that
Kingrey was born in Seoul, South Korea, and subsequently moved
to California when she was adopted. 93 She then moved with her
adoptive family to Louisiana and lived in Morgan City, Lafayette,
Broussard, Youngsville, and Houma. 94 She then moved to West
Virginia with her husband, Romero, as part of his relocation for
work. 95 Trahan was born, raised, and still lived in Houma. 96 Devon
was also born in Louisiana (Lafayette) and had spent half of his
life either in Lafayette or Houma, up until the time his mother
moved to West Virginia, relocating with her prior to this case.97
The Court noted that Devon had a stable and supportive family
structure in Louisiana and was of the opinion that it would be
desirable to maintain that environment. 98

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id.
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F. Holding
The Court concluded that Kingrey did not meet the burden of
proof required of her as the relocating parent in a relocation case. 99
In addition, the Court found that Trahan was more likely than
Kingrey to provide Devon with a “stable and permanent” residence
in Louisiana. 100 The Court further noted that both Trahan and
Kingrey were capable of being available for Devon as far as
custody was concerned. 101
The Court reversed the judgment of the 32nd Judicial District
Court and rendered judgment in favor of Trahan as domiciliary
parent of Devon. 102 The Court determined that the parties should
have joint custody of Devon and that visitation of Devon should be
awarded in favor of Kingrey. 103 The Court determined that the
previous visitation schedule devised by the trial court for Trahan
should stand, with Kingrey rather than Trahan as the visiting
parent. 104
III. COMMENTARY
The Court approached this decision very methodically and
provided an excellent framework for the way in which Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 and Louisiana Civil Code article 134
operate in conjunction with each other. The Court arrived at the
correct decision by the letter of the law, and it seems the judgment
is also equitable considering the facts and circumstances.
Nonetheless, there are a few areas of this decision that present an
opportunity to ask questions as to how the outcome could have
been improved.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To begin with, it should be noted again that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:355.14 was revised in 2012, just after this case was
heard. 105 It was previously Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.12.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 comment (a) states that the
revision changed the opening language of the statute to make it
clear that a court does not need to make a factual finding on every
factor. 106 Here, this Court made a finding as to each of the twelve
factors. Such analysis was not needed then, and certainly is clearly
not needed now, per comment (a). 107 Failure to analyze each factor
does not constitute an error of law triggering a de novo review. 108
The court is free to give whatever weight it deems appropriate to
any of the relocation factors. 109
Second, the visitation schedule that was assigned to Kingrey
was exactly the same as that was originally assigned to Trahan by
the trial court. The Court addresses that visitation plan while
analyzing factor three, 110 and expresses its concern that the sheer
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would have led to a
substantial decrease in the amount of time Trahan could spend with
Devon because of the financial constraints of such travel. 111 The
assignment of that same visitation plan to Kingrey does not remove
the principal problem that the Court addressed. The Court merely
shifted the burden that Trahan bore in the visitation plan to
Kingrey. This action does not alleviate the problem created for the
child’s relationship with his non-domiciliary parent.
That being said, Factor 3 does concern the preservation of the
relationship of the non-relocating parent with the child, and that
“non-relocating” parent is not Kingrey. Therefore, the Court may
105. See supra note 36.
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, cmt. (a) (2012).
107. See Poe v. Stone, 118 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2013), citing
Gathen v. Gathen, 66 So. 3d 1, 9 (mentioning that a court is not required to
expressly analyze each of the twelve relocation factors).
108. Id.
109. Poe, 118 So. 3d at 1229.
110. See supra Part II.D.
111. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
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not be concerned with the financial constraints that traveling from
West Virginia to Louisiana puts on Kingrey because she is the
relocating parent. Moreover, it is certainly understandable that it is
extremely difficult to devise a visitation schedule for two parents
separated by roughly a thousand miles that is both feasible
financially and fosters a good relationship between the nondomiciliary parent and the child.
The ultimate concern in cases such as this should be what is
best for the child. It is the author’s opinion that the visitation
schedule does not adequately help foster a good relationship
between Kingrey and the child. It does seem equitable that
Kingrey, as the relocating parent (taking into account also that
living in West Virginia is no longer required for Kingrey and
Romero), should incur the cost of travel for visitation. Kingrey is
only granted thirty-five days in the summer and, not including the
holiday rotation, thirty hours per month. The thirty hours per
month seems profoundly low. While devising a visitation schedule
that is fair and does not put the child in strenuous situations is
difficult, in these kinds of predicaments more could probably be
done. Even just providing an additional weekend per month in
which Kingrey could visit Devon if she were to travel to Louisiana
rather than have Devon travel to West Virginia might suffice.
Understandably, Kingrey may not have the ability to finance her or
Devon’s traveling from Louisiana to West Virginia, or vice versa,
but the option to do so should be there. Thirty hours per month,
which includes travel time, is just not enough to maintain a healthy
relationship between a parent and a child.
Third, Kingrey has a nuclear family structure that seemed to be
overlooked. Kingrey is married to Romero and Kingrey has two
other children, Jade and Noah, who visit during the summer and
holidays (the same time as Devon), and Romero has two children
that live in Lafayette. 112 Therefore, through his mother’s side of
112. Id. at 355.
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the family, Devon has two half-brothers, a step-brother and a stepsister. While it is a very scattered family unit, the presence of a
married couple running a household and the connection with
siblings is valuable for a young child and seemed to be
overlooked. 113 Meanwhile, Trahan is not married, lives with his
parents, and has no other children (albeit he has a rather large
extended family). 114 This could have been a circumstance that
helped Kingrey’s case, had it been considered in either Factor 1 or
Factor 12 of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, or even in
Factor 5 of Louisiana Civil Code article 134. Perhaps, however,
the Court felt that preserving and cultivating Devon’s relationships
with his paternal extended family outweighed the need to do so
with his siblings. 115
Even had the Court addressed these two concerns, undoubtedly
the outcome would have been the same. The only change that may
have been warranted is minor tweaking to the visitation schedule in
order to better foster Devon’s relationship with his mother as long
as she continues to reside at such a distance from Devon.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this author’s opinion Trahan should have been named the
domiciliary parent, as the Court decided. However, the visitation
schedule is far too inadequate for the minor child. A mere thirtyfive days in the summer, rotating holidays, and a scant thirty hours
per month, which includes travel time for the child, is simply not
sufficient to foster a healthy relationship between Devon and his
mother.

113. See Cucchiara v. Cucchiara, 543 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (evaluating custody and considering the fact that the child would live in a
nuclear family by residing with his mother).
114. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355.
115. See Franklin v. Franklin, 763 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2000)
(considerating the child’s relationship with his siblings and also other significant
persons in the child’s life in evaluating custody).
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It seems as if the aim of the Court was simply to hand back to
Kingrey that which had been handed to Trahan by the trial court.
The Court even made reference to the fact that the visitation plan
the trial court gave to Trahan was inadequate to foster a
relationship between Devon and Trahan. 116 While it seems that
Kingrey may well have been trying to use the relocation, after her
husband no longer needed to reside in West Virginia for work, to
remove Trahan from Devon’s life as much as possible (and the
court points out the fact that she had attempted to do so in the
past 117) retaliation for such acts should not be the aim of a
visitation schedule. The main concern is, and always should be, the
child’s best interests. The author is of the opinion that, whenever
possible, and in the best interests of the child, having both parents’
influence in a child’s life is better than having just one or the other,
or a limited amount of one or the other. It does not seem that a full
effort was put into devising a visitation schedule here that would
be best for the child.
The fact that Kingrey is the relocating parent and that she (and
perhaps her husband) no longer has any good reason to remain in
West Virginia should be taken into consideration. But that
consideration should only be in regard to which parent becomes
the domiciliary parent and who bears the costs of transportation,
not as to how the visitation schedule breaks down.
The rigors of long distance travel on a young child must also be
considered. And perhaps this is why the Court stuck with the trial
court’s visitation schedule. For a young child, traveling from
Louisiana to West Virginia once every month can be extremely
stressful. Therefore, making the child travel every other weekend
to West Virginia would not be in the best interests of the child. But
visitation time with his mother is certainly in Devon’s best interest.
For that reason, it is the author’s opinion that an equitable solution
would have been to simply add to the visitation schedule that
116. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
117. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, Factor 5 (2012).
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Kingrey could also travel to Louisiana herself once per month, on a
weekend, and have an additional thirty hours of visitation with
Devon, with all costs to be incurred by her. While, financially, she
may not be able to afford such travel on a consistent basis, at least
the option would have been afforded her, and that would certainly
serve the best interests of Devon. While Kingrey may have been
conspiring the remove Trahan from Devon’s life, there was no
mention by the Court that Kingrey was an unfit mother and, thus,
there is no reason to deprive Devon of the influence, guidance, and
relationship with his mother any more than necessary to make this
custody plan work.
Besides the slight tweaking of the visitation plan, the author is
of the opinion that this case is a superb example of the way in
which the relocation factors (in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:355.14) and the best interests factors (in Louisiana Civil Code
article 134) operate in conjunction with one another. The Court
does an excellent job of breaking down the case by each particular
issue and analyzing each in a very methodical manner. Moreover,
it serves as a stark reminder to attorneys that if the proper
procedure is not followed in relocation scenarios, the results can be
devastating for the client.

